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THE "THIRD MAN ARGUMENT" AND THE TEXT OF PARMENIDES
Robert G, Turnbull 
The Ohio,State University
Gregory Vlastos' 1954 article[l] on the so-called
"Third Man Argument" (henceforth, TMA) of Plato’s Parmenides 
gave astonishing prominence to a short stretch of the text 
of that dialogue, namely 132A1-B2, and elicited an equally 
astonishing outpouring of sophisticated argument concerning 
self-predication and related issues.[2] It is my intention 
in this paper to place that bit of text in context in the 
dialogue, attempting to show (a) that, though there are sim­
ilarities, it cannot, easily be identified with-anything 
which Aristotle would have recognized as the TMA and (b) 
that most of the Vlastos-inspired controversy is irrelevant 
to the interpretation of that text and its context. It is 
not my intention therefore to enter the controversy but
rather simply to establish the irrelevance claim. On the
way to establishing it, it will be helpful to pause briefly 
to inspect an implied argument at 130C which, when, made fulr- 
ly explicit, is remarkably close to ;a TMA which Alexander 
attributes to Polyxenus[3] and which has the minor virtue of 
involving the (possible) form Man, not Large. Part I will 
set the stage for the argument at 132A1-B2. Part II will 
attempt careful statement of that argument, implicitly and 
explicitly criticizing the statement(s) of it by Vlastos and 
some , of his critics. Part III will deal briefly with Aris­
totle's most extended statement of the TMA in Sophistical 
Refutations!41 in the interest of distinguishing it from
that of Parmenides 132. In Part IV, the conclusion, I-shall
attempt brief and schematic summation of the first three 
parts. ...
Part^'f: PARMENIDES 127E-130E4. THE OPENING ARGUMENTS
After preliminaries, the dialogue proper begins with 
SocratesV restatement of an argument of Zeno which, by modus 
tollens, concludes that "it is impossible for the beings to 
be many" (127E7). In literal translation, the argument is 
as follows:
Z. If the beings [or those which are] are many, then 
they must be likes and unlikes.
But it is impossible for them to be both likes and 
unlikes.
So it is impossible for the beings to be many.
Assuring himself that the whole point of Zeno's treatise
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(read aloud to an assembled company before the dialogue 
proper begins) was to establish the above conclusion, Socra­
tes expresses surprise at discovering Zeno’s book to be in 
defense of Parmenides’ doctrine— a defense of ”No Many” com­
plementing Parmenides’ ’’One”. He then proceeds to a rebut­
tal of Z, giving a response which attempts (i) to immunize 
the Platonic forms from Z^ and (ii) to render harmless the 
application of Z to individuals or "visibles” which are said 
to "participate in" or "have shares of" the forms.
The immunization proceeds with the claim that there is 
no sense of ’is’ in which a form is^  anything but simply, 
solely, and self-identically itself (cf. especially 129D3- 
E2). Though Likeness and Unlikeness, One and Multitude 
(Socrates' examples) are "opposites", each is separately and 
indivisibly what it is. Each is thus, as being the form it 
is, just that, and none "is" one or more of the others. So 
no argument of the Z-type can have application to the forms, 
for the protasis of Z *s conditional premiss can have no 
application to a form or forms. In what Socrates takes to 
be any relevant sense, the forms are not many.
The application of Z to individuals or "visibles" is 
rendered harmless by Socrates’ insistence that any given 
individual may be both like and unlike, one and many, etc. 
without contradiction or paradox. This is possible, he in­
sists, because an individual "is" like and unlike, one and 
many, etc., only in virtue of having shares of (metechein) 
Likeness and Unlikeness, One and Multitude, etc. Thus, in 
his example, Socrates may have a share of One (as "being" 
one man) and also of Multitude (as ’'being" his parts) and 
thus "participationally" or "sharingly be" one and many. It 
is not the case that the individual is. anything but itself, 
and there is no Zenonian restriction on having♦
And so, if anyone undertakes with such examples to 
show that the the same things are many and also 
one— stones, sticks, and the like— we shall say 
that he demonstrates that a given thing can be 
both many and one, but not that One is Many nor 
that Many is One. What he says is not at all sur­
prising, but only what we should all agree to 
(129D2-6).
So in this case the minor premiss of Z is denied applica­
tion: It is perfectly possible for individuals to "be" both 
likes and unlikes by having shares of opposite forms.[5]
Neither Zeno nor Parmenides makes any attempt to chal­
lenge Socrates’ logic. If Socrates can make good his dis­
tinction between forms which are what they are, on the one 
side, and participant individuals which have shares of 
forms, on the other side, and if tie can supply an intelligi­
ble sense of ’have a share of’ (metechein with the genitive 
of share), he can (a) agree that, if beings (in this case
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participant ind ividuals) are many, then they must be likes 
and unlikes but (b) deny that it is impossible for them to 
be both likes and unlikes. Parmenides, who undertakes the 
questioning of Socrates, quite naturally begins by asking 
about the distinction and shortly turns to asking about the 
intelligible sense.
His first 'questions inquire whether Socrates will main­
tain the separation (chorismos) between participant indi-* 
viduals and their "shares" on the one side and the forms 
themselves on the other for several varieties of forms. In 
putting his first question, Parmenides assumes that the 
"shares" fall on the side of the participant individuals and 
are quite distinct and separated from the relevant forms.
.And does it seem to you that there is likeness 
Itself separate from the likeness we have, and One 
and Many and all of the others of which you just 
now heard Zeno speak? (130B 3-5)
Using schematic letters and subscripts for forms, shares of 
forms, and participant individuals, the pattern suggested by 
Parmenides' questions (as well as later questions and argu­
ments) can -be made to stand· out. Let *Fj ! , ' Ü2 ’ > etc. be
used for forms. ' f χ * ’ fp ’ » etc . be used for shares , and 
* 3c i ', 'x,2 etc. be usedror participant individuals . So, 
in the above quotation, Parmenides is asking (for certain 
forms) whether, whenever there is some value of IT which some 
value of jc has, there is also a value of E which is separate
from the value of f. which the value of x_ has as a share.
(Notes It will be assumed that values of F and values Of i . ■ · 
which have common subscripts are related as are, e.g., Like­
ness Itself and the likeness we have.)
Parmenides' first question concerns forms for likeness, 
one, many, and the others mentioned or highlighted by thé
Zeno treatise. It is difficult to give a definite charac­
terization to these so as to· expose the principle of their
grouping.. Since it is not strictly needed for the purposes
of the. present paper, I shall only hint at what I think is 
the proper way to state the principle and add some clarifi­
cation in a footnote. The hint is that the forms in the
list are forms which participant individuals have shares of 
only in virtue of their having shares of yet other forms, 
thus two participant individuals may have shares of Likeness 
Itself only in virtue of having shares of, say. Justice It­
self or Largeness Itself. This is, of course, only a hint, 
and it needs refinement: to take counter examples into ac­
count. [6] But the present purpose demands only the distinc­
tions already made between forms, shares, and participant 
individuals· And:Parmenides ’ question asks only about the 
assumption of a farm, separate f rom the share and/or the 
participant individual. And Socrates' answer is affirmative 
for the, forms -highlighted in Zeno ' s treatise'.
Parmenides'' second question asks about Just Itself
3
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Noble Itself (Kalon), Good Itself, "and the like", separated 
from justice, nobility, and goodness "in us". So that for 
these, as well as the Zenonian examples, whenever there is a 
value of _f which some value of x has, there is always a 
value of F which the value of x has a share of and, by so 
having a share, has the value of f,.
Parmenides’ third question changes the pattern remarka­
bly and offers a serious challenge to Socrates’ response to 
Zeno. The question is:
And what about a form of man, separate from us and
from all others like us— a form of man, or of
fire, or of water? (130C 1-2).
Here the question is not? Is there a value of I?, separate 
from the value of _f which a value of x has? It is rather: 
Is there a value of F separate from a givèn value of x? 
Socrates responds to this question by saying that he has 
been "often in an aporia [straits, puzzlement, no way out] 
concerning these whether one must speak of them in the same 
way or in some different way." And, of course, for the as­
sumptions made in his response to Zeno, there is an aporia.
DIGRESSION·. PARMENIDES' THIRD QUESTION AND THE TMA
This third question of Parmenides obviously concerns 
sortal, "substance", or thing-kind forms (ignoring fire and 
water for a moment), and the rationale for Socrates' reply 
to Zeno is hardly appropriate for them. I think that there 
is reason to believe that the reply to Zeno and the doctrine 
of Phaedo which that reply echoes is grounded in Plato's 
attempt to give an intelligible sense to sentences of the 
form '_x is f_'. The problem of giving such a sense arises 
from the difficulties of 'is':. If one takes the 'is' in '_x 
is f ' as requiring that both 'x' and ’f_ ' name the same 
thing,[7] it is hard to avoid construing all such sentences 
as stating some sort of identity and thus falling into thé 
hands of Zeno and Parmenides. As we have noted, the idea of 
Phaedo and Socrates' reply to Zeno seems clearly to be the 
construal of 'jç is JE_' as ?x has Τ' , thus avoiding the 
identity problem. With this construal, the treatment of 
values of £ as shares of F (The F Itself) is natural enough, 
especially with the verb, 'metechein'. with its genitive of 
share ready at hand.
Before directly engaging Parmenides' third question, it 
will help to say something about values of 'F' and their 
predications. It has been often noted that Plato, in Phae­
do , not only allows but insists upon the truth of sentences 
having the form of 'The Beautiful Itself is beautiful'. And 
he insists that The Beautiful Itself is really beautiful, 
whereas Helen, say, is only humdrumly beautiful, indeed is 
both beautiful and not beautiful. The problems of coping 
with this insistence are notorious, and we shall advert to
4
PARMENIDES' "THIRD MAN ARGUMENT"
them again later. I shall, however, ignore the large liter-
___a-tiuro— “o n_ijt....a-nd simply claim that, even for the Plato of
Phaedo and Socrates' reply to Zeno, the proper way to con­
strue sentences of the form 'F is F (or f)' is 'F is What it 
is to be. F' . So understood. The Beautiful Itself is taken 
out of the beauty contest with Helen and is really beautiful 
in the sense that, as what it is to be beautiful, it is the 
very essence of the beautiful, whereas Helen is only a beau*- 
tiful thing, i.e., a participant individual which has a 
share of The Beautiful Itself.[8]
The problem raised by Parmenides* third question is: 
How shall we construe, e. g ., 'Jones is a man'? (Attic 
Greek, having no indefinite article, makes the point slight­
ly more difficult to see, for it would give us 'Jones is 
man' and thus the form of 'x, is f.' .) As we have seen, the 
genius of the Phaedo doctrine and that of Socrates' reply to 
Zeno is that it construes sentences of the form 'x is f'
'.X has f ’ , but this will hardly do for 'Jones is a man 
For the sentence would then be construed as ’Jones has (a) 
man' .; But Jones may have a likeness or a wise in him, but 
he can hardly have a man in him. ' Indeed, he is a man.[9]
as
1-
But if one forsakes the has construal of predication for
participant, individuals (in - the·· case of sortais), the iden­
tity problems of Zeno and Parmenides loom large again. As 
Parmenides puts the question: Is Socrates prepared to accept
a form Man in addition to us and others like us not in ad­
dition to the man we have (the parallel to the likeness wè 
have)? The doctrine of Phaedo and Socrates’ reply seems 
reasonably well suited to characterizing forms but ill 
suited indeed to sortal forms.
Fleshing out: the implied argument which leads Socrates 
into aporia on this matter appears to give us a TMA:
If *L1 is·, a man by virtue of having a share of The 
Man Itself, then it must have a share (i.e., a 
man) in it. But it would seem that j q , to be a 
value of x. at all, must be à man (or a horse, cow, 
tree, or whatever). Given this and given that The 
Man itself is man in the sense of What it is to be 
a Man, then the having a share account requires a 
redundant and unnecessary third man (viz;, the 
share of The Man Itself).
So put, the argument looks remarkably similar to one attri­
buted to the Sophist Polyxenus and quoted by Alexander Aph- 
rodisias in the latter's comment on an Aristotelian allusion 
to the TMA at Metaphysics 990b 15:
If a man .is by partaking of or having a Share of 
the form or The Man Itself, there must be some man 
who . will have being in relation to the form. But 
neither The Man Itself, which is a form, nor any 
given man is. by partaking of a form. Some other
5
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is left to be a third man having being in relation
to the form.
Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics » 62,29-33
As we shall see in Part III, this is not Aristotle’s 
TMA as found in Sophistical Refutations 178b37-179all. 
Though laying great stress on the individual or the tode ti, 
Aristotle's TMA generates an infinite regress. The Polyxe- 
nus argument does not, though it is directly relevant to 
this portion of Parmenides. It should suffice here to point 
out 'that the implied argument of Parmenides' third question 
introduces the difference between sortal and other forms, 
brings on a Socratic expression of bewilderment, and invites 
a formulation like that of the Polyxenus quotation from Al­
exander .
It is difficult to comment on the fire and water 
portion of Parmenides' third question. That they are listed 
rather simply with man suggests that Plato links together 
what Strawson calls "bulk” or "stuff" terms with sortais. \ 
Their presence in the list suggests that Plato does not 
think of the "shares" of the forms doctrine as physical 
parts or pieces öf participant individuals. Both fire and 
water admit in Attic Greek of sortal-style use as subject 
terms with the definite article in either the singular or 
the plural. One might, with that in mind, think of Third 
Fire or Third Water arguments. But any extended comment on 
the passage would be idling for the present paper.
THE UPSHOT OF THE EARLY ARGUMENTS
Parmenides' fourth question concerns forms for "hair, 
mud, dirt, or any other vile and worthless thing." Is Soc­
rates in straits (aporiaV about them too? Despite their 
offering, as sortal-like things the same problem as fire and 
water, Socrates professes no difficulty with them. There 
are no forms for them; "they are just such as we see (hor- 
opien) them to be" (130D 3). It's difficult to make out this 
comment, and it is tempting to think of it as giving such 
things the status given to colors, sounds, etc. in Theaete- 
tus and Timaeus, i.e., as existing only relative to the
interaction of our sensory organs and the "outside" physical 
world.[10] Parmenides' immediately following comment, how­
ever, suggests only that Socrates' ought not to despise such 
things and that they ought to have the same status as water 
and fire.
Before turning to the arguments in the immediate con­
text of what is commonly taken to be the TMA, I wish to un­
derline the major features of the account so far. First,
Socrates* response to Zeno provides the obvious context for 
understanding the first part of Parmenides. And that reply, 
as we have seen, requires distinguishing what I have been 
calling participant individuals, shares, and forms. Second,
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the response requires thinking of *jç is f ' as 'x has £_* and 
thinking of such having as having a share of a form. Third, 
since having is not the same as being (in a strict sensé), 
participant individuals may have any number of shares of 
quite different forms without those individuals having to be 
likes and unlikes in any damaging way. Fourth, Socrates' 
reply does not allow any form, to have a share of any other 
form and, by virtue of this insulation from having shares, 
construes each form as selfsame or as a single and, if you 
please, isolated "being".
THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE SOrCALLED TMA
At 130E6, Parmenides shifts from inquiry about what 
sorts of things there are forms for to inquiry about having 
a share or shares (metechein or metalambanein). The focus 
of his inquiry seems obviously to be the difficulty of sup­
plying a sense to 'having a share' which preserves the claim 
that each form is selfsame or single. Several senses are 
considered, all of which result in denial of that claim. 
And, if Socrates is forced to accept the conclusion that 
each form is not single or selfsame, he must recognize that 
his forms are entangled by Zeno's argument and that he has 
not given a satisfactory reply. To paraphrase Zeno's argu­
ment: if, a form is many, then it must be (in an invidious
sensé) like and unlike. What I earlier called the 'immuni­
zation* of the forms will have failed. What is more, if no 
unobjectionable sense can be given to 'have a share or 
shares', the application of Z to individuals will not be 
harmless, i ,e., their being likes and unlikes will trigger 
Zeno's conclusion of "no many".
Parmenides starts by noting.that Socrates' participant 
individuals have the names of the forms which they have 
shares of, thus what has a share of Likeness is a like and 
what has a share of Largeness is a large (130E9-131A3). And 
then . he. proceeds immediately to point out that the ordinary 
meaning of 'have a share or shares' would seem to. require 
that anything which has a share either has the whole or a 
part of that of which it has a share. And the standard or, 
if you please, literal meanings of. 'metechein* and 'meta­
lambanein 'fill have that same requirement. If two different 
things each have the whole of something as their shares, 
then it would seem obvious either that they don't really 
have it or that what they have shares of is somehow divided 
and thus not single and selfsame.
Socrates suggests that several different things may all 
share in the same day. Despite a number of commentators * 
taking this seriously, I think they obviously misunderstand 
the context. That 'metechein' or 'metalambanein' may be so 
used metaphorically is obvious. The point is, however, that 
Parmenides is here, concentrating .on an ordinary or standard 
meaning, and the metaphorical meaning is simply out of 
place. He turns shortly to metaphorical meanings, but still
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encounters the difficulty of the form’s being many.
Despite the impression created by this and several ar­
guments to follow, it should be noted that Plato takes this 
first part of the dialogue as initiating a search for a 
clear sense of 'have a share or shares of' which will save 
some version of Plato's doctrine of forms and having shares 
from the ”no many” consequence of Z. Parmenides' remark at 
135B4-C2 is indication of that intent:
But, if on the other hand anyone, fixing on these 
and other similar arguments, were to deny that 
there are forms of the beings, not marking out a 
form for each one of them, he will have nowhere to 
turn his thought, since he does not lay down a 
constantly selfsame form for each of the beings, 
and he will thus utterly destroy our ability to 
carry on discussion.
And the context of this statement is that of the negative 
results of the search noted above. The suggestion is, of 
course, that further search or a differently organized 
search will result in a defensible response to Z.
The next move made by Parmenides at 131C is not really 
a move at all, for it suggests that participant individuals 
have parts of the form(s) as shares. It is not a move, for 
the idea that a form is divided into parts is admission from 
the start, as it were, that the form is many and not single 
and selfsame. Parmenides ends this little section by say­
ing:
Then, in what way, Socrates, will other things 
come to have shares of these forms of yours, if 
they cannot have shares either as parts or wholes?
And so the stage is set for what Vlastos and others identify 
as the TMA, and I now turn to that argument.
Part II: Parmenides 132A1-B2. THE SO-CALLED TMA
I shall first give an extremely literal translation of 
the passage, then comment briefly on some features of the 
translation, and then give what seems a natural interpreta­
tion of it in its context. Only after having completed 
these shall I turn to Vlastos and his critics.
132 Parmenides I think that it is for some such
reason as this that you believe that each form is 
one. Whenever many things seem to you to be larg­
es, in like manner there seems some single idea 
(appearance, look) which, to you as you look at 
(idonti) them, is the same in all of them. Hence, 
you take the large to be one.
8
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5 Sócrates That's true.
Parmenides What of the large itself and the other 
larges? If in exactly the same way you were in 
; your mind’s eye [literally, try means of t your; soul] 
to, look at ,them all, would not yet another large 
appear to be one, by which all of these appear to 
be larges?.
Socrates So it seems.
IQ Parmenides Then another form of largeness will 
make its appearance, coming to be in addition to 
largeness and those, having shares of; it. And yet 
another besides all of these, by which they will 
all bê larges. And ,thus each of your forms will 
by no means one, but rather an unlimited multi- 
; tUde .
: COMMENTS ON THE TRANSLATION
At 132A1, I translate the text as 'believe each form is 
one*. This is the literal reading of 'hen hekaston eidos 
oiesthai einal'. Cornford translates it as 'believing in a 
single Form in each case'.[12] Vlastos translates it as 'to 
hold. that there exists one Form in each case *. In both of 
these, the reading of 'hekaston' as 'in each case' is egre­
gious, for *hekaston’ obviously qualifies 'eidos*The; mat- ; 
ter is as such of little moment, except that the Corn- 
ford/Viastos reading suggests that the point in question is 
rather more "How can there be a form whenever there is a 
collection of like things?" than "Granted that there ^ r e  
forms, how' can a form be. one or single?". .
132A contains the first use of * idea* in the dialogue. 
The standard word for form up to this point in the dialogue 
has been 'eidos *. And this first use of 'idea' occurs in 
immèà-iat e!. ./‘çpnnec%ioä·./ wi tjh' ' idonti * --a dative participle
meaning (in context) 'to you as you look at’. 'Idea', which
is a form of the same verb', ' ideih* . has the primary meaning 
of 'semblance', . 'appearance’, or ’look’. This connection 
between 'idea* and 'idonti* suggests what might account for 
the singularity of the form in the case of many like partic­
ipant individuals is that they all look, the same or have the 
"sains look". Τ η  this s a p  connection, it should be noted 
that a form of ’idein* is used again in line 132A7 for ex­
pressing thé "look" one might have with his "soul" or 
"mind's eye". , I
I have used 'larges', to transíate *t_a me gal a ' . This is 
in accordance . with Parmenides' agreement at; 130E9-131A3, 
allowing participant individuáis to have the names of the 
forms of which they have shares* Thus any x which has a 
share of F may be called an .*£* ; here, any participant;!
9 ,
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individual which has a share of The Large Itself may be 
called a ’large'.
INTERPRETATION
As noted earlier, the issue raised by Parmenides in the 
section immediately preceding this one is that of a form’s 
being one or single while many participant individuals have 
either the whole or parts of the form as shares. And 132
begins with another approach to the same issue. Perhaps
there may be another way— 'if you please, a metaphorical way- 
-in which several participant individuals can intelligibly 
be said to have shares of a form without making the form 
many. What Parmenides suggests is that, whenever one looks 
at many larges, he/she is presented with a single look which 
is the same for all of the larges. Thus this suggestion is 
that, for a number of participant individuals, all larges, 
to have shares' of one and the same Large is for each of them
to present one and the same idea (appearance or look).
This, at first blush at least, seems to get around the prob­
lem brought on by having several participant individuals 
either having the whole or parts of the form as their 
shares. And it does not quickly transform into the "part” 
account as did Socrates' earlier suggestion of the day.
The problem Parmenides finds with this suggestion lies, 
if you will, in the logical grammar of the language of look­
ing and appearing which permeates the passage. Appearances 
or looks would seem to lie on the side of what appears to 
one or what is looked at and not on the side of the seeing 
or looking at. Appearances or looks are, at least linguis­
tically, objects of seeings and lookings at. It ought to 
make sense, therefore, for them to be seen or looked at. 
Indeed, even in English, it is grammatically possible to see 
a look, e.g., "Did you see the look on his face?". Parmeni­
des exploits this bit of logical grammar.
After the initial formulation, with its to you as you 
look at and the look, he proceeds at 132A6 to invoke the 
same logical grammar for mind’s eye looking. The looking 
this time is on the part of the soul (tei psychei). It 
could hardly be a standard looking (i.e., visual), for one 
obviously cannot look at an appearance or look in the same 
way in which he/she looks at larges (large things). But, if 
that appearance or look is construed as an object, it is 
possible to exploit the logical grammar of looking and looks 
in Parmenides’ way. So Socrates is invited to have a "by- 
means-of-his-soul" or "mind's eye" look at the several larg- 
es and the large look (the large idea— the purported form). 
They are, by hypothesis, many, all of them "larges". And, 
by the same reasoning which got us the first look or idea 
which is the same in all, we shall get another look or idea 
which is the same in all of these. 1 Applying the same ex­
ploitation of the logical grammar of looks and appearance 
talk, this process can be made to go on over and over again.
10
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so the form as look or idea turns out to be."for you by no 
means one, but an unlimited multitude” .
The: form is an "unlimited multitude”, if the argument
is sound, in that there is an indefinite number of entities, 
all different from each other, which can be named by ’The 
Large Itself . And thus the form-name does not name a sin­
gle entity, as Socrates’ reply to Zeno requires.
It is worth reiterating that the ostensible purpose of 
Parmenides’ questions right from the start., is to get clear 
about the notion of having a share, of a form. The reason 
for the questions about having the whole pr part of the form 
as a share is: to point out that participant individuals can­
not literally have shares of forms, i.e., in the way that 
several, people might have shares of a fortune or a pumpkin 
pie. With that in mind, one may well read the ideas or 
"looks" argument as an attempt to understand having a :share 
of a form by attending to the ordinary sense of * idea * as 
appearance or look. Indeed, the shift in the dialogue from 
the use of *eidos’ to the use of ’idea/, marking the first 
occasion of the latter ’s use in theftext, invites that read­
ing . .
Socrates’ next attempt is to suggest that the form may 
be a noema, a thought, which, properly, can be "nowhere else 
than in souls" (132B4). Socrates connects this with the 
earlier suggestion of the idea by claiming that "that way 
[i.e., by taking the form as a noema] each would be one and 
would longer be open to the objections which you have just 
now made" (132B5-6). I take this to mean that forms as 
thoughts do not allow for the indefinitely replicative pro­
duction of ideas or appearances which;the logical grammar of 
looks and appears talk invites. Parmenides disposes of the 
noema suggestion by drawing a disjunctive distinction, each 
disjunct of which is objectionable. Taking noemata strictly 
as thoughts-of-jc (whatever x. may be) and assuming - that 
participant individuals have shares of these, he concludes 
that every such individual must, as participating or having 
a share, think. And that simply won’t do. Assuming that 
every thought must be of something "which is one, which that 
thought thinks placed in all, some idea [appearance, } look] 
which is one" (132C3-4), the form will turn out to be this 
thought-of and not the thought. This disjunct requires that 
there are thoughts (noemata) which are not thought, and, 
with the reappearance of idea, there is the suggestion that 
this disjunct gets us back to the replicative problems of 
the "looks" account.
That these two attempts (i.e., idea and noema) at 
supplying a sense to ’having a share’ and, perhaps, ’form’ 
are related to one another is beyond question. Aside from 
Sotrates’ claim that the noema account would avoid the 
problem of indefinite replication (which one disjunct of the 
noema account fails to do), both the idea and the noema
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accounts are psychological or soul-related. A look or an 
appearance is invariably to someone (as the text insists) 
who is looking or seeing. Indeed, it is just this which 
generates the indefinite replication. On the noema ac­
count [133, once we separate the confusion of thought and 
thought-of which gives the account a specious plausibility, 
we are left either with the unacceptable conclusion that all 
things think or with, in effect, the problems of the idea 
account. I believe that these psychological accounts serve 
the same purpose as the wholes and parts as literal shares 
account, namely that of clearing away underbrush before al­
lowing Socrates to give the account which permeates the mid­
dle dialogues, namely, th¿ "pattern/copy" account of 132C12- 
133A6. Since there is no indication from earlier dialogues 
that Plato had seriously attempted to examine the intelligi­
bility of the notion of having a share of a form, there is
nothing demeaning or odd about putting these underbrush­
clearing attempts into the mouth of a very young Socrates.
VLASTOS AND HIS CRITICS
In his own reformulation of the argument (in "Plato's "Third 
Man" Argument: Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly,
1969, 289ff.) of his 1954 paper , Vlastos boils the 132A1-B2 
argument down to the following steps
1 .If a certain set of things share a given charac­
ter then there exists a unique Form correspond­
ing to that character; and each of these things 
has that character by participating in that 
Form, (p.290)
From this and the assumption that
la. a, Jb, and c are JF, 
he derives
lb. There exists a unique Form (which we may call
"F-ness") corresponding to the character, F_, and 
a, 1i, and _c are F by participating in F-ness.
(p. 291).
He reformulates the second step of the argument as:
2.If a, b_, and a, and F-ness are F, then there 
exists a unique form (which we may call "F-ness 
II") corresponding to I?, but not identical with 
JF-ness; and ji, Jb, c_, and FJ-ness are JF by 
participating in F-ness II. (p. 291)
In order to affirm the antecedent of 2., Vlastos claims to 
need, in addition to la. and lb., what he calls "Self-Predi­
cation" , viz.,
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SPA Form by participation in which anything has a, 
certain character must itself have that charac­
ter. (p. 291)
But it is clearly not enough to be able to assert that a , J), 
o-, and F-ness are F, for one may agree to that and also to 
1. without admitting to the need for yet another form, F- 
ness II. So Vlastos adds what he calls "Non-Identity17, 
viz. , .
Nllf anything has a given character by participat­
ing in a Form, it cannot be identical with that ; 
Form. (p. 291) -
And so there follows the consequent of 2, and :with it the 
denial of 1. Vlastos' claim about the argument.comes down . 
to the insistence that one may not consistently hold to 1., 
SP. and NI. And this is clearly true.
Leaving many niceties of their accounts aside, Wilfrid 
Sellars and later Colin Strang[14] remove the inconsistency. 
by substituting 'at least one form' for 'a unique form' in 
Vlastos' 1. This makes possible the generation of the re­
quired regress along with SP and NT without the incon­
sistency. Vlastos, in his 1969 reply to them,[15] rejoins 
(and I think correctly) that the text will not support -the 
'at least one Form' reading. Others, notably R.E. Allen, 
Peter' Geach, and Julius Moravcsik, have entered the Vlastos 
controversy, more or less on Vlastos'. own terms; [16] As I 
indicated at the outset, I shall not enter it, but .rather 
deny that Vlastos' formulation states the argument of Par­
menides 132A1-B2. Given the TRANSLATION COMMENTS and IN­
TERPRETATION above, my reasons for so doing should be pa­
tent,; but it is worthwhile, I think to make some comments on 
the Vlastos formulation, especially since they purport to 
give the .sense of the actual text.
. First,; there is nothing in the text which requires or 
justifies the talk of things "sharing a given character" and 
of "a unique Form corresponding to that; character." There 
is indeed talk of "many larges" and of an idea (look, ap­
pearance) which is one and "the same in all of them." Vlas­
tos appears to construe the .··*idea* of the argument as naming 
or indicating what he calls a character and not as naming or 
indicating the form. The earlier arguments (concerning 
having the whole or part of the form as a share) do · allow 
for participant individuals Which have shares of a form to 
have the name of the form. But the notion of a "shared 
character" over and above the form of which the participant 
individuals are said to have shares is an ontological impor­
tation which, if subjected to scrutiny, adds a gratuitous 
problem to the already vexing one of giving some intelligi­
ble sense to 'having shares of a form'.
Cornford[17] used the term 'immanent character' as a
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way of talking about the "shares" which participant individ­
uals are supposed to have when "having shares of a form." 
Such immanent characters— needed for the final argument of 
the Phaedo— are individuals (not "shared characters") which 
may be or have "share opposites" just as the forms of which 
fhèy are shares may be or have "form opposites". Thus, in 
the Phaedo argument, the hot in this fire (an immanent 
character) will "flee or perish" rather than allow "a cold" 
in its location. The issue in the present argument of Par­
menides is one about having shares of a form. If one 
follows Vlastos in assuming that there may also be such a 
thing as having shares of a "character" (his 1., above), 
there would then seem to be yet another one-many problem to 
confront, namely that of how many participant individuals 
may be said to have shares of a "character." There is not 
the slightest hint in the text of this gratuitous problem.
Though I think that the "immanent characters" of Phaedo 
are best thought of as individuals in the sense that the hot 
in this fire cannot be identical with the hot in that fire, 
it is compatible with the Phaedo text to thin of immanent 
characters as entities which more than one participant indi­
vidual may "have". Thus a hot of a certain degree may be 
"had" by more than one thing. What would add the gratuitous 
problem would be thinking of a hot as something which sever­
al participant individuals may have shares of. But the 
present text in no way invites any talk about the shares of 
immanent characters which participant Individuals may have. 
Its point is simply to consider a possible account of what 
having a_ share of a form may be.
Second, the immediate context of the Parmenides argu­
ment is, as we have seen, concern about how a form can be 
one or single. If it is not one or single, then Socrates' 
reply to Zeno is in jeopardy. Given that the attempt of the 
present argument is to try once more to defend the claim 
that individuals may have shares of the form without requir­
ing the form to be multiform, the idea of rescuing Plato 
from Vlastos' charge of inconsistency by changing 'a unique 
Form' to 'at least one Form' is unsettling, I sympathize, 
of course, with the desire to construe the argument which 
Plato puts in Parmenides' mouth as at least a reasonably 
good one and have tried so to construe it. But the con­
struction of the; argument as giving away at the outset what 
Socrates is trying hard to defend scarcely gives Plato more 
credit than Vlastos' inconsistent premiss set.
It is difficult, in this connection, to understand why 
Vlastos follows Cornford in translating 'hekaston' as 'in 
each case' rather than the more natural and straightforward 
'each form to be One*. Cornford misconstrues the argument 
as one concerned with the "existence" of forms as such and 
not with the problem óf non-multiplicity or oneness of the 
form. Vlastos follows Cornford in so translating, though my 
guess is that his reason for doing so is his having the
14
PARMENIDES1 ’’THIRD MAN ARGUMENT"
"character/form" distinction in the back of his mind. Thus, 
in paraphrase (of Vlastos' 1.): "Whenever a certain set of
things share a given character, then there exists a single 
or unique form for èach such case."
Third, Vlastos’ re-statement of the argument completely 
ignores the "to you as you look at" and "look at with your 
soul" (or "in your mind’s eye") parts of the text. In his 
1956 paper,[18] Vlastos speaks of an "epistemological” 'ver-, 
sion of the argument, paralleling the "ontological" formula­
tion given in his 1954 paper. While this talk·of an "epis­
temological" version speaks somewhat to my concern, the 
treatment of "look at", etc. as incidental to the "logic" of 
the argument requires that the text— and Plato— be patron­
ized . For Parmenides plainly uses these terms as though 
they were crucial to the introduction of, at least, the sec­
ond "large". And the juxtaposition of ’idea' and 'idonti' 
at the beginning is prima facie at least as crucial to the 
introduction of the first "large". It is, of course, philo- 
logically undesirable and, perhaps, detrimental to discern­
ing Plato's intentions to choose an interpretation which 
patronizes the text unless the text is, in itself and in 
context, impenetrable.
Fourth, I agree that something akin to "self-predica- 
tion" is required .by the argument. The Large Itself (qua 
look or idea) must be the sort of thing which you could 
"look at with your soul"— along with the .other larges. In 
turn, the large which "appears to be one" in that egregious 
glimpse must also· be "lookable-at" along with the other 
larges. And so on, As I would read the argument, however, 
the moral is not to be found in exploiting any of the stand­
ard worries about self-predication. It is rather to be 
found in recognizing that, if one thinks of a Socratic: form 
as the "look" or "appearance" of things looked at, he/she 
will have to think of the form as psychological and, lin­
guistically, caught up in the associations, of 'looks’ , ’ap­
pears', and their kin. There is no evidence in the text of 
apy attempt to arrive at or >exhibit a contradiction or, in­
consistency— as Vlastos says, that it does, in f inding his 1., 
SP, and NÍ an inconsistent se’f. Obviously, however,: ,it is 
part of Parmenides’ point to claim that Socrates' cannot, 
without inconsistency, maintain that each form is one or 
single and also that the form is the look (idea) of things 
looked at.
The Parmenides 132 passage has, on the face of it, the 
following form:
a. x.i , x2 , etc . all have shares of Fy « There is ,
a certain single idea,or look, namely, Îq which is 
in or of all of them. ;
b. χ,Ι» X.2* etc · » and Fj are all fs (the former being 
"named after" Fj, the latter being, what they are
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Mnamed after").
c. Since they are all fs, there must be another idea 
or look, namely, F2 which is in or of Χχ , x.2, etc. 
and in or of Fj.
d. And so on through F 3, etc.
a. does the work of Vlastos' 1., la., and lb. b. does the 
work of Vlastos* 2. But b. does not require SP as Vlastos 
states it in order to get the argument going. It requires 
only the assumption that x 1, x.2 » ete· all have Fj in or of 
them and that the participant individuals and the form are 
all fs. c. does, in its way, incorporate NT, i.e., it 
requires another idea for jc χ , x^ » etc., and £χ , namely, F 2.
Vlastos* statement of the argument, as we have noted, 
takes the argument as leading to contradiction or inconsis­
tency. In context, however, the only inconsistency noted is 
that of maintaining the form to be one while construing 
having a. share as having n single idea or look and allowing 
the idea to be itself looked at (and thus itself having an 
idea or look). The problem with the Vlastos* formulation 
is, I believe, the intrusion of the common "character**. As 
I noted earlier, this requires a double sharing— once in the 
character and once in the form. All that the text requires 
is that the initial larges and the idea which is in or of 
them be all construed as larges with yet another idea which 
is in or of them. The upshot of Parmenides* actual argument 
is the inconsistency of (i) maintaining that having a share 
of a; certain form is having a certain idea or look, (ii) 
maintaining that than any given idea or look can also have a 
share of a form though not of itself, and (iii) maintaining 
that the form is one or single.
Part III: ARISTOTLE AND THE TMA
Aristotle's only extended statement of the Third Man 
Argument is in Sophistical Refutations 178b37-179all. In 
presenting it, I have translated 'tode ti' by 'this thing 
here* and intend its finding application in the juxtaposi­
tion of the demonstrative, the token reflexive, and various 
"thing" or "substance" terms, as in 'this man here', ’this 
horse here*, etc.
There is also the argument that there is a third 
man over and above man and the individuals. For 
neither man nor any other common signifies a this 
thing here but rather how qualified, with respect 
to what, in what manner, or other such. Likewise 
in the case of Coriscus and cultured Coriscus—  
are they the same or different? For the one sig­
nifies a this thing here, the other how quali­
fied— but the latter in such a way that it is not
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[grammatically] set apart. It is not the setting 
apart which makes the third man, but the joining 
together as the this thing here. For the very 
thing which Callias is and also the very thing 
which man is will not both be this thing here.
Even if one were to say that the set apart is not 
the very thing which this thing here is but is 
rather the very thing which how qualified is, it 
would make no difference. For there would still 
be a one in addition to the many, for example, 
man. It is clear therefore that it must not be
granted that what is predicated commonly of many 
is a this thing here, but rather that it signifies 
how qualified, or with respect to,, or how much or 
many, or some such.
The structure and the point of the argument are, des­
pite some textual obscurity, fairly clear. The passage as­
sumes that there are basic individuals, which Aristotle gets 
at most characteristically by means of ’this thing here" 
(tode ti) both here and in Metaphysics Zeta. And the 
passage denies that a common term as such (whether in predi­
cate position or juxtaposed with a proper name) gets at or 
signifies a this thing here. The argument of this and other 
passages is of a piece with Aristotle's doctrine of pros hen 
ambiguity, i.e., that the various "being" terms in the acci­
dent categories do not signify in their own right but only 
as indirectly signifying this thing here.'s. Aristotle needs 
both common terms, e.g., man, and individual terms, e.g.» 
Coriscus. Let the individual term be the first man and the 
common term the second man. What Aristotle denies is that 
the common term is a special individual and that there is 
needed yet a third man to be predicated of both it and the 
individual. In his accounting, there is really only the 
individual; the second man is simply a picturesque way of 
talking about the function of a common term. The third man 
puzzle arises when one confuses the function of a common 
term with that of an individual term, thus taking man or 
cultured to be a this thing here. Obviously one needs 
individual and common terms to get on with discourse, but 
taking the latter as also individual terms adds a perplexing 
one in addition to the many,
Aristotle’s comment about a third man at Metaphysics 
1038b35-1039a3 is obviously of a piece with the passage from 
Sophistical Refutations. It occurs in Zeta in connection 
with a series of arguments to show that the universal (to 
katholou) cannot be ousia (substance, tode ti):
From these [arguments, considerations] it is quite 
clear that none of those holding universally is 
ousia and that none of those predicated commonly 
signifies this thing here, but rather how quali­
fied. Otherwise, there are many other consequenc­
es including the third man.
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Even as the two passages just cited hang together, so 
also does another from Metaphysics (990b16-18) and Alexan­
der's comment on it, the latter allegedly taken from Afisto- 
tle’s (lost) On the Forms. The Metaphysics passage is:
Of thé more precise arguments, some make forms of 
relatives to j pros t.i'sl for which we say there is 
ho kind fgenos] just by itself, others formulate 
the third man.
The arguments, of course, are arguments for Platonic forms. 
Alexander's alleged quotation makes clear, I believe, what 
sort of "precise argument" may be in question.
The third man proof is as follows. If a term is 
truly predicated of many, and if it is other than 
those of which it is predicated, then it is sepa­
rate from them. (This is what those who lay down 
the forms believe they show. The reason given for 
there being Man Itself over and against the men 
is: That a man is really predicated of the indi­
vidual men who áre man, and it is other than the 
individual men,)· But if this is so, there will be 
a third man. For if a man predicated of them is 
other than those of which it is predicated, and if 
it stands alone, and if man is predicated both of 
the individuals and of the form, there will be a 
third man in addition to the individuals and the 
form. And thus a fourth, predicated of this and 
of the form and of the individuals, and likewise 
also a fifth, and so on· indefinitely.
Alexander Aphrodisias, Commentary on Met­
aphysics . 62(1.33)-63(1.9)
The second sentence of the above states what appears to be a 
"precise" argument for forms (i .e ., for "separate" forms) . 
Aristotle's Claim is that, if Man Itself is separated from 
the individual men, then, since the individuals and Man It­
self are both mèn, a "third" man will be predicable (and 
thus separate from them) of both— à "fourth" of those three, 
a "fifth" of the resulting four, and so on. I think that 
Aristotle (and Alexander) grants that the "second" is other 
than the "first", but he denies that it follows from this 
that the "second" is separate"from the "first". If we think 
it is separate— as do those who "lay'down the forms"— we 
have the third man regress on our hands.
The pattern of thèse Aristotelian references is clear 
enough. Start with an individual, a tode ti, sáy, this man 
here or, if you please, Goriscusi Let a term be predicated 
of that individual, say, Man. If Man is construed as a 
common term, and is in no way taken as signifying an indi­
vidual, then Aristotle finds no problem. But, if Man is
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taken as somehow signifying an individual (in the relevant 
case, a form), then, since both Coriscus and Man are in­
dividuals, it must, be possible to predicate Man of them 
both. And the Man predicated of both of them will, of 
course, be a third Man, If it, in turn, signifies an 
individual, we will need yet a fourth Man to be predicated 
of it and the other "men". And so on.
As I noted earlier, this argument is similar in some 
respects to the Parmenides "Large" argument. Both arguments 
depend upon somehow construing a common term as an individu­
al and then counting it and the individuals to which it is 
common as in need of yet another term to be common to them, 
and so on.
But the similarity is ho more than skin-deep, and the 
Aristotelian argument offers no real clue to the interpreta­
tion of the Parmenides "Large" argument. In particular, it 
offers no clue to the "looking" (idein) features of the 
"Large" argument and thus to the principle which generates 
the regress. In the Metaphysics Zeta passage and, I think, 
in the Sophistical Refutations passage, Aristotle is at 
pains to argue that the universal (to katholou) cannot bef 
this thing here (tode ti) . . The upshot is patent in the very 
definition of the universal äs what holds for many and the 
requirement that this thing here be individual. The regress 
of Aristotle’s argument is generated by violating the defin­
itional requirement and by the demand for another universal 
to hold for the individual and the product of the violation.
There is as more reason to identify the pattern/copy 
argument of Parmenides 132D-133A with the Aristotelian TMA. 
In the pattern/copy argument, however, the problem comes 
with requiring pattern and copy to be likes and then 
treating likeness as having a share of a_ common form. Once 
again, there is indefinite generation of forms. In this 
case the formal similarity to Aristotle’s TMA is closer, for 
the generation of fresh forms is straightforwardly analogous 
to generation by the need of fresh common terms.
What one suspects, of course, is that the arguments of 
Parmenides were lying about for handy appropriation by Ar­
istotle (and, perhaps, others). Given his coming up with 
the conceptions of individual and common; terms which lie 
behind parts (at least) of the Organon, the adaptation of 
such arguments seems very likely indeed. [19] As there is no 
special reason to think of him as interested in finding a 
sense for ’metechein * which provides a satisfactory response 
to Zeno, the TMA becomes a polemical weapon rather than a 
means of sophisticating a basic Platonic doctrine.[20] In­
terestingly enough, the tortured pages of Zeta not only 
evoke the TMA; they also attempt to meet the demand for 
form in the thing. In that-attempt-; I; believe, Aristotle 
comes perilously close to the Platonism of the late dia­
logues. [21] But that invites another story and another pa-
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per.
I can hint at that story by pointing out that Aristo­
tle's doctrine of universals is kin to Socrates' suggestion 
in Parmenides that forms might be construed as noeroata. 
Once one gets Aristotle away from the ambiguity of individu­
al and common terms (words? thoughts? things?), thé problem 
of what the universals or noemata are o_f requires something 
like that· form/matter doctrine of Metaphysics. And á case 
can be made for taking that doctrine as one way of coping 
with the basic problem of Parmenides.f221
Part IV: SUMMATION
I have attempted to show that the "Large" argument of 
Parmenides 132 must be understood as part of the attempt to 
clarify Socrates' response to Zeno. As such, the threat to 
that response is to the requirement that each form be one 
and not many. But it is also, of course, a threat to the 
very idea of having a share of a form. In context, the 
argument is underbrush clearing, getting an unworkable idea 
out of the way. Indeed, the first part of Parmenides gets 
several such unworkable ideas out Of the way, the idea 
thesis being only one. Formally. Parmenides starts with the 
Zeno challenge (what I have1called '.Z,', goes on to Socrates' 
response, then moves to Parmenides' criticism of thät re­
sponse. The upshot of that criticism is not the abandonment 
of the Forms. Indeed, as we have noted, even Parmenides is 
made to insist that, without them, "our ability to carry on 
discussion" will be destroyed. What one is naturally led to 
expect from the first part of Parmenides is sophistication 
of the doctrine of forms and having shares to meet Z and the 
arguments put in the mouth of Parmenides. And, when Socra­
tes, at the end of the first part^expresses bewilderment as 
to where he is to go from here, Parmenides informs him that 
he needs exercise (gymnastike) in the method practiced by
Zeno and proceeds to give him a lengthy example with "his
own" supposition, "If One is".[23]
The placement of the 132 "Large" argument in the full 
text of Parmenides depends very much upon one's under­
standing of the objective(s) of the whole dialogue. If one 
thinks, as I do, that the effort is to sophisticate the doc­
trine of forms to meet the predication problems posed by
Zeno, he/she will indeed think of the "Large" argument as
rejection of a prima facie possibility for meeting those 
problems on the way to a successful meeting of the prob­
lems .[24] If one thinks that Plato is prepared to defend 
Socrates' response to Zeno to the death, he/she is likely to 
look for the errors in Parmenides' arguments in the first 
part. But even in the latter case, one is Obliged to fit 
the "Large" argument into the context of Parmenides' ques­
tioning of Socrates and to pay close attention to details of 
the text.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in. The Parmenides 
Philosophical Review 63 (1954), 319-49.
2. See Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: University Press, 
1973), 361-2, for a partial· but useful listing..
3. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysic, 
62,29-33. Translated and quoted in the "DIGRESSION" of Part I, below.
4. Sophistical· Refutations 178b37-179all. Translated and quoted 
at the .beginning of Part III, below.;
5. One might restate Z; somewhat as follows. Suppose there to be 
just three things, A, B, and C. Suppose further that, using them, one 
attempts predication. Thus one might assert that A is B* But, of 
course, A is A. Unless one trivializes by taking the terms to be dif­
ferent names for a single thing (contrary to hypothesis), he/she will 
have to say something, like "Insofar as A is B it is unlike itself and 
like B; but insofar as A is A_ it is like itself and unlike B." If this 
procedure is repeated for: the combinations of A, B, and £, we may think 
of it as involving the assumption that many are and as leading to the 
conclusion that they are likes and unlikes (both themselves and the 
others). If this procedure is protested as not properly being predica­
tion but rather identity. the response is a challenge to come up with an 
intelligible account of predication. Socrates attempts one by saying 
that, for example and schematically, A could have a share of B without 
its being B. With this construal Of predication, things could be 
"sharingly" likes and unlikes without,any such impossibility as that the 
same thing must be both like and unlike itself and another.
p. See R.E. Allen, Plato's PARMENIDES (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983), 106-7. It is worth noting, as Allen does, that 
the forms in question figure as the forms repeatedly used in,the several 
versions of the "One Supposition" in the second part of the dialogue* 
One can think of these as the forms to be investigated by dialectic as 
suggested by the account of noesis in the analogy of the line in Re­
public VI.
7. See fn. 5 above, I have argued [in "Zeno’s Stricture and Pred­
ication in Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus," forthcoming in How Things 
Are, ed. J. Bogen and J. McGuire (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983)]" that the 
later dialogues of Plato suggest that Plato takes seriously the idea 
that, in predication, the two terms name the same thing. What saves 
this idea from triviality is (a) the: recognition of names having wider 
or narrower scope and (b) the recognition that things in the world of 
becoming can, in virtue of their complex structure, be subject to dif­
ferent (form) names. The making of this argument is a bit involved and 
assumes that Plato solves the problems raisedin Parmenides in a par­
ticular way.
8. See Alexander Nehamas, "Self-Predication and Plato’s Theory, of 
Forms," American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol, 16, No. 2, 1979, 93-103*
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9» The difference here being highlighted is, of course, that ex­
ploited by Aristotle in Categories by distinguishing "predicated of" 
from "present in". English, unlike Attic Greek, uses the indefinite 
article to mark the former usage, as in 'Jones is _a man'. The doctrine 
of "having a share" simply will not work at all for "is a(n)" predica­
tion. Thus Plato's examples in earlier dialogues are almost uniformly 
of what Strawson would call "characterizing" predications (if you wish, 
"is" predications).
10. As I understand the doctrines of Theaetetus and Tiaaeus, the 
physical world is made up of the Platonic regular solids configured in 
various ways. These have, individually and in configuration, shape, 
size, motion, position, etc.— the "mathematical qualities". But they do 
not in themselves have the "sense qualities". The objects of aisthe- 
sis— the aestheta— are actually physical qualities, but qualities which 
exist only as the result of interaction of sense organs (which are them­
selves physical) and the surrounding physical environment. The sugges­
tion that there are no forms for dirt, hair, etc. is, I think, the sug­
gestion that there is no regular form configuration which their physical 
counterparts embody. It is pretty clear that the Plato of Timaeus and 
Philebus is prepared to recognize forms for all manner configurations, 
and that may be the point of Parmenides’ patronizing remark about Soc­
rates' later sophistication.
11. Both terms are used frequently by Plato, 'metalambanein' having 
more the sense of coming to have a share of. Plate's metaphorical usage 
was not original to him. It was common, e.g., to say of a courageous 
man that he has a share of (metèchei) courage.
12. F.M. Cornford, Plato ¿nd Parmenides (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1936), 87.
13. It is interesting to note that the noema account is formally 
similar to Aristotle’s account of "universals" (ta katholou)♦ Aristotle 
is prepared to treating universals that those holding for many änd to 
deny, more or less on that ground, that the universal can be ousia or 
tode ti. This, of course, gives him the problem of saying what it is in 
things which makes possible the applicability of universals. And meet­
ing this problem fills some of the most tortured pages of Metaphysics.
14. Wilfrid S. Sellars, "Vlastos and 'The Third Man,'" Philosophi­
cal Review 64 (1955), 405-37; "Vlastos and 'The Third lían': A Rejoin­
der," Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, IL, 1957), 55-72. Colin 
Strang, "Plato and the Third Man," Proceedings of the Aristotelian So­
ciety, Supp. Volume 37 (1963), 147-64.
15. G. Vlastos, "Plato's "Third Man" Argument (Parin. 132A1-B2): 
Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1969), 289-301. Reprinted 
in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: University Press, 1973), 
342-61.
16. R.E. Allen, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle 
Dialogues," Philosophical Review 69 (1960), 147-64; P. Geach, "The
Third Man Again," Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 72-8; Julius Morav-
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csik, "The 'Third Man* Argument and Plato's Theory of Forms," Fhronesis 
8 (1963), 50-62.
17. Cornford, op. cit, 78ff.
18. G. Vlastos, "Postcript to the TMA: A Reply to Mr. Geach," Phi­
losophical Review 65 (1956), 83-94.
19. This is, of course, highly speculative. But Aristotle's dis­
tinction between individual and common terms is not, and the insistence 
upon individuals as ontological bedrock is not. Posterior Analytics II, 
for example, is especially insistent on the redundancy of forms as prin­
ciples of explanation once one has clearly grasped the difference be­
tween individual and common terms and the use of definitory formulae as 
middles. The straightforward use of the difference in the TMA formula­
tion in Sophistical Refutations is highly significant.
20. Cf. Metaphysics 987bll-15, "[Plato] simply changed the name to
participation fmethexis]. For, whereas the Pythagoreans say that the
beings are by imitation Γmimesis] of the numbers, Plato says by 
participation fmethexisl, changing the name. As to what either
participation or imitation may be, they jointly neglected to search 
out." Since Aristotle is fairly scathing in such comments as this one, 
and since he has what he takes to ..be. a successful and- alternative ac·* .. 
count of predication, he betrays no interest in sophisticating methexis 
to meet obvious objections.
21. As I read those later dialogues, they take take forms to be, as 
suggested earlier in the paper, principles of structure and participant 
individuals to be structured things, though they continue to recognize 
the separation of principles of structure. (See R.G. Turnbull, "Know­
ledge and the Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues," Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1978, 735-58.) I 
say that Aristotle comes "perilously close" in that he is obviously pre­
pared to recognize form as shared by many things and allows for human 
beings to take on the forms of things without their matter.
22. See fns. 21 and 13 above.
23. As I read the so-called "second part" of Parmenides, the "ex­
ercise" (gymnastike) which Socrates is alleged to need is primarily in 
the adumbration of the logical space of all of the forms, thus rather 
like the task of dialectic in the doubly-divided line of Republic. The 
necessary frame (or logical space) of inquiry must make provision for 
the interrelationships of forms, their source in the one which is, and 
the possibility of both forms and individuals sharing structure(s) with 
forms. With some such frame in place, a rationale can be provided for 
the sort of research which Plato puts under the heading of collection 
(synagoge) and division (diairesis) and illustrates profusely in, e.g., 
Statesman.
24. See fn. 23. What must be added, though the defense of it far 
exceeds the scope of this paper, is the idea that to have a share of a* 
form is (a), in the case of forms, to be a specification of a principle 
of structure or (b), in the case of individuals, to embody a principle
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of structure. For a start on the task of explaining and defending this 
idea5 see my "Knowledge and the Forms in the Later Platonic Dialogues," 
cited in fn. 21.
24
